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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

March 16, 1960

DCI-2512-60

Executive Registry

60-1857

*File*

17 Mar 60

MEMORANDUM

FOR: The Honorable  
Allen Dulles *AD*  
Director  
Central Intelligence Agency

FROM: John A. Calhoun *JAC*  
Director  
Executive Secretariat

The following telegram is enclosed for  
your personal information:

TOPOL 1809 to Paris, cy 14

SECRET Enclosure

State Dept. review completed

# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

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SENT TO: Amembassy PARIS TOPOL PRIORITY

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08157

Info:

RPTD INFO: Amembassy LONDON 6934  
 Amembassy BONN 1977  
 Amembassy ANKARA 2572  
 Amembassy ATHENS 2613  
 Amembassy BRUSSELS 1068  
 Amembassy COPENHAGEN 711  
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EMBASSY AND ALL OTHER ADDRESSEES FYI ONLY  
 GENEVA FOR EATON AND WADSWORTH  
 PARIS DELIVER BURGESS 8:00 AM MARCH 16.

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You are authorized inform NAC orally in private session March 16 substance correspondence exchanged between Khrushchev and President. Department wishes stress presentation should be oral with no record and special precautions should be taken maintain secrecy since privileged Presidential communications involved. BEGIN FYI. Adenauer will be informed by President during Chancellor's visit. Similar summaries to that which follows are being conveyed to UK French Canadian and Italian Embassies by Department. END FYI.

In moderately toned and carefully phrased letter dated March 3 Khrushchev stated he decided write letter when he convinced himself

Drafted by: EUR:SOV:ADubs:ms 3/15/60	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:	Richard H. Davis EUR - <del>ROY DIX WOODKIN</del>
Clearances SOV - Mr. Service - Mr. McSweeney S/AE - Mr. Farley (in draft)	EUR - <del>ROY DIX WOODKIN</del> S/S - Mr. Calhoun	GER - Mr. Hillenbrand (in draft) RA - Mr. Fessenden (in draft)

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President's statements at press conferences February 3 and 17 and Secretary's statement February 8 were interpreted as expression US intent to equip US non-nuclear allies particularly within framework NATO with nuclear weapons. Very important that none of nuclear powers (among which France mentioned) take any steps that could complicate solution problem of complete elimination nuclear weapons. Nuclear test negotiations and 10-nation disarmament talks directed toward this end. If US Allies either individually or within framework of NATO had nuclear weapons placed at their disposal USSR would have every justification hand over these weapons to friendly countries in response their requests. Special concern expressed over nuclear sharing with FRG which might be tempted use weapons to fulfill QTE special mission UNQTE to which Chancellor recently referred. Widening circle of nuclear powers would create obstacles to disarmament and increase dangers nuclear war. Soviet policy to prevent world war and bring about prohibition and destruction nuclear weapons under effective control.

In response March 12 President welcomed opportunity clarify US policy and remove misapprehensions US purpose. Following are main points President's letter:

1. Remarks about FRG reflect misunderstanding nature post-war German state. FRG desires peace and does not present aggressive threat to any country.
2. Khrushchev in error when inferring change had taken place or was in progress in US policy on transfer nuclear weapons or information on their design or manufacture. US policy to avoid widening circle nuclear powers and this policy implemented in actions of US and reflected in basic laws especially Atomic Energy Act

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Act 1954 as amended. However we do not know whether or not USSR places nuclear weapons at disposal of members Warsaw Pact or other of its allies.

3. Must be recognized that states with major industrial capability cannot be expected to be satisfied indefinitely with situation in which nuclear weapons uncontrolled and they themselves do not have such weapons for their defense against forces which Khrushchev himself made clear on numerous occasions already possess most modern and destructive armaments. To help meet this legitimate need <sup>of our</sup> allies NATO atomic stockpile system established. Under this system custody atomic warheads remains in U.S. alone as provided by law and they can be used only in defense against aggression. Circle nuclear powers not widened thereby.

4. While it generally agreed technical means not now available for assuring elimination past and present stocks nuclear weapons surest method of dealing with proliferation problem is to make progress toward effective disarmament agreements under verifiable conditions. Specifically efforts should be made (a) to reach agreement at Geneva on discontinuance those nuclear tests which can now be effectively controlled (b) to adopt safeguards procedures under aegis International Atomic Energy Agency to ensure that future expansion of nuclear power production does not itself become source for fissionable material for production nuclear weapons and (c) to agree in the disarmament negotiations beginning March 15 to proposal which US has urged repeatedly since 1956 i.e. cessation production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons purposes as soon as effective inspection measures are agreed and operating and simultaneously therewith to begin transfer of fissionable materials

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materials from weapons stocks to peaceful purposes. Since there little prospect achieving much in field of disarmament at summit unless some solid progress already achieved in Geneva negotiations, President expressed hope Khrushchev would instruct Soviet representatives as we have ours make every effort eliminate differences to point where there will be something concrete to deal with at Paris in May.

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